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THE POST-CONVICTION HEARING ACT1949-1960 AND BEYOND
JAMES E. STARRS

lawyer and layman alike rarely evokes
more than extremist appraisals. Either it is an intolerable
congeries of technicalities and senseless entanglements or it is
the headline-catching, viscera-stirring sensationalism of a trial for one
of the more awe-inspiring crimes. Criminal procedure is, however,
certainly much more than that, for without effective procedure even
the loftiest principles of substantive law would be inoperative. Just
such a mechanism for effectuating our basic constitutional liberties is
the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act.' Its original purpose was to
insure a corrective remedy for persons convicted in proceedings
which did not conform to accepted constitutional standards. Now,
more than eleven years after its approval, and after undergoing interpretation in thirty-seven reported decisions of the Illinois Supreme
Court, it is meet that the act be evaluated both in the light of its initial
design and the decisions which have construed it, and according to
legislative and judicial efforts of a like vein elsewhere, as well as more
basic policy determinants. An analysis of this nature will bear mute
testimony to the status of the judicial process, both as an instrument in
achieving a measured congruity of law to the requirements of certainty and as a means of assuring a continued correspondence between law
and the elements of its growth.
The Post-Conviction Hearing Act was enacted to resolve a critical
situation created by an apparently unfathomable post conviction "procedural morass" in Illinois, which had elicited first the suspicion and
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1 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 826-832 (1959) (approved August 4, 1949).
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then the outright denunciation of the United States Supreme Court."
In case upon case,3 Illinois had argued that federal jurisdiction was
lacking since Illinois courts had denied relief for adequate non-federal
procedural reasons. In time, however, it became apparent that Illinois
did not provide any proper procedure to permit challenges to the constitutional validity of its convictions. In consequence of this realization, the United States Supreme Court strongly recommended 4 that
the federal courts in Illinois take cognizance of petitions for writs of
habeas corpus by state prisoners. In assuming such jurisdiction, the
federal courts were advised that no evasion of the rule of exhaustion of
state remedies was involved, since there were in fact no state remedies
to exhaust. This propelled the Illinois Legislature into action.
The Post-Conviction Hearing Act was drafted to assure an adequate, simplified, and unequivocal method by which a person convicted in the Illinois courts could present his claims of constitutional
deprivation. In consonance with that intent, an independent, original,
and collateral proceeding of a civil character,5 somewhat akin to the
statutory substitute for the common-law writ of error coram nobis,6
was devised to test the substantial denial of state or federal constitutional rights occurring in the course of the proceedings resulting in the
conviction.
Even these preliminary terms establishing the nature and scope of
the act manifest the necessity for judicial interpretation. How is a
"substantial denial" 7 to be distinguished from other denials of constitutional rights? As yet, the Illinois Supreme Court has not been confronted with this issue but it has, in passing, referred to "substantial"
constitutional rights," a modifier neither expressed in the act itself nor
explicated by the court's opinions. Further, is the recognition of such
denials to be limited to those occasioned "in the proceedings which
2 Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561 (1947). See particularly Mr. Justice Rutledge's concurring opinion, ibid.
3 Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 (1947); Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946).
4Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561 (1947).

5People v. Bernatowicz, 413 Ill.
181, 108 N.E.2d 479 (1952). Therefore it would seem
that the attributes of a civil proceeding should obtain, such as discovery and subpoena
duces tecum. See Leighton, Post-TrialProcedures,47 ILL. B. J. 261 (1958).
6 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 72 (1959).
ch. 38, § 826 (1959).
8 People v. Hartman, 408 Il.133, 96 N.E.2d 449 (1951).
7 ILL. REV. STAT.
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resulted in his conviction"? 9 If so, then on a plain reading of the
statute, constitutional deprivations arising both prior and subsequent to
the original trial should not be cognizable under the act. But, in People
v. Reeves,'0 the Illinois Supreme Court, after examining the constitutional validity of a pre-trial restoration hearing, decided, uninfluenced
by whether the hearing was itself part of the proceedings resulting in
his conviction, that no denial of due process was evident. Again in
People v. Griffin," on remand from the United States Supreme Court,
a direction was issued to the trial court to provide free transcripts of
the original trial to the defendant for the purpose of direct review by
writ of error. Although unenunciated in the decision, it seems evident
that the denial of a free transcript to an indigent defendant would not
be sufficient to invoke the act since it did not occur in the proceedings
resulting in the conviction. On analysis, however, the decision is
sound, for otherwise form would be exalted over substance to the degree that, as before the act, no remedy would be available to contest
12
this constitutional issue.
Unlike the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act,'3 the Illinois
Post-Conviction Hearing Act does not supplant by consolidation other
extant post-conviction techniques. 4 Rather, in supplementing them, it
seeks to bridge the gap between them and federal habeas corpus.' 5 If,
then, the purpose of the act was to remedy those situations where existing procedures were in some way inadequate, it would seem that resort
to the act would be permissible only after an initial indication that no
other procedure was available. This, in effect, was the dictum of the
early decision in People v. Hartman,1 6 but, in the development of later
9 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 826 (1959).
10 412 111.555, 107 N.E.2d 861 (1952).

119 l.2d 164, 137 N.E.2d 485 (1956).
12 In Illinois, writ of error reviews only errors appearing on the face of the record.
Habeas corpus examines jurisdiction over the person or subject matter and coram
nobis lies to review matter dehors the record which, if known to the trial court, would
have resulted in a different verdict. A request for a free transcript would not be within
the scope of any of these remedies.
13 9B UNFoRM LAWS ANN. 344 (1955). Accord, MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, §645A (1957).
14 Nor are other remedies superseded under the motion to vacate sentence in the
federal courts. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (1948); United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954).
15 People v. Wakat, 415 111.610, 114 N.E.2d 706 (1953).
16 408 Ill. 133, 96 N.E.2d 449 (1951).
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cases, the requirement was not reasserted.' 7 Today, therefore, in Illinois, not only is there no exclusive codification of post-conviction procedures but the broad sweep of the post-conviction act itself has percolated into areas traditionally allocated to the writs of habeas corpus
and coram nobis to the extent that the convicted criminal or his counsel may choose among various alternatives. Thus, under some facts,
i.e., the knowing use of perjured testimony, either a petition under the
post-conviction act may be lodged or a proceeding under the statutory
substitute for the writ of error coram nobis may be instituted; and under other situations, i.e., lack of jurisdiction over the person, one may
elect either to petition for a writ of habeas corpus or for post-conviction act relief; or again, on other occasions, i.e., a confession coerced
by force, either a post-conviction petition or direct review by writ of
error may be selected. Indeed, the recent decisions reveal that it is the
practice to petition under the act immediately after sentencing and to
seek review by writ of error both of the conviction and the denial of
post-conviction relief in a consolidated appeal.'8
To be eligible to initiate a proceeding under the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act, the petitioner must be "imprisoned in the penitentiary."' 9
All felons are included in this category, 20 except those who are confined to the county jail awaiting the execution of the death sentence
and women committed to reformatories. However, the language of
the act has been so judicially construed 21 that the fact of conviction for
a felony rather than the situs of confinement determines eligibility.
7
1

To require a showing not only of constitutional denials but the possibility of a
different result without them, approximates this position. See State v. Graves, 251 N.C.
550, 112 S.E.2d 85, (1960), and Justice Daily's dissent in People v. Hryciuk, 5 I1.2d 176,
186, 125 N.E.2d 61, 66 (1955).
18 People v. Thomas, 18 Ill.2d 439, 170 N.E.2d 543 (1960).
19 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 826 (1959). Doubtless, situations may arise meriting the
re-evaluation of this requirement to effect a common sense application of it. Assume,
ex hypothesi, that a petitioner is on parole either from the conviction now challenged
or from a later federal or state conviction, or that he is imprisoned under a subsequent
federal or state conviction as a recidivist in consequence of the conviction now in
issue, or that the petitioner, having served his sentence, seeks to upset the conviction in
order to restore his civil rights or merely to eliminate the criminal stigma. It is conceivable that the petition will be peremptorily denied either since petitioner is not "imprisoned in the penitentiary" or since his imprisonment did not result from the conviction he strives to overturn.
20
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, S 585 (1959).
2
1People v. Dale, 406 Ill. 238, 92 N.E.2d 761 (1950); People v. Lewis, 413 I11.
116,
108 N.E.2d 473 (1952).
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Proper venue under the act is, as it is in statutory coram nobis,22 in
the court in which the conviction took place. 23 The administrative ad-

vantages of such a provision were persuasive in moving its adoption.
The convicting court, certainly, is aware of the facts and background
of the particular case, except, of course, where time dulls treacherous
memory or where the petition is heard by a different judge than the
one who sat at the original trial. Furthermore, the cost of obtaining the
testimony of witnesses at the hearing will be considerably lessened, and
the courts at the places of confinement, already surcharged with
habeas corpus petitions, will not experience the additional burden of
these petitions and, in all probability, will note a reduction in the number of habeas corpus petitions. On the other hand, there is something
subtly instructive in the Maryland statute 24 providing for a hearing
before the same judge who officiated at the original trial only when the
petitioner consents.
A properly prepared petition must contain sufficient facts, without
argumentation, to indicate a denial of constitutional rights. Mere conclusory declarations, therefore, are unsatisfactory.25 In addition, the
petition must identify all prior proceedings brought to secure relief
from the conviction. 26 Affidavits or other relevant evidence should also

be attached to the petition in substantiation of its factual claims or their
absence should be satisfactorily explained. Although doubtless a
complete transcript of the trial proceedings may be attached to the
post-conviction petition, 28 the decision in Griffin v. Illinois29 poses the
more acute problem of whether an indigent defendant may demand as
of right a free transcript of the trial to buttress the factual assertions of
22 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, S 72 (1959). But a petition for a writ of habeas corpus may
be entertained either by the court at the place of confinement or by the court where
the conviction occurred. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 65, § 2 (1959).
23

Accord, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (1948);

§ 3, 9B

UNIFORM LAWS ANN.

UNIFORM

POST-CONvICwION PROCEDURE Act

344, 354 (1955).

24 MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, S 645G (1957). In Oregon venue is at the place where the
petitioner is imprisoned. ORE. REV. STAT. ch. 636, S6 (1959).
25 People v. Bernatowicz, 413 l. 181, 108 N.E.2d 479 (1952).
26 ILL. REv. STAT.

ch. 38, § 827 (1959).

2T

Ibid.

28

People v. Bernatowicz, 413 Ill. 181, 108 N.E.2d 479 (1952).

29 351

U.S. 12 (1956).
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his petition. 30 The equal-protection-of-the-laws rationale of the
Griffin holding would appear to be determinative of this issue, too,
particularly since, like the writ of error on direct review, 3 ' a postconviction petition may be filed as of right equally by rich and poor
alike.
A few years after the enactment of the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act, one commentator, in surveying the effect of that act, remarked
that "in Cook County, it has become the practice to file a motion to
dismiss automatically on the first appearance of the case."31 2 The indication was, therefore, that rather than answering the contentions of
the petition and proceeding to a hearing on the merits, the State's Attorney of Cook County had arbitrarily entered a motion to dismiss in
all cases. Not until the Jennings decision in 1952, on remand from
the United States Supreme Court, was the appropriate ambit of the
motion to dismiss clarified. Under that decision and under subsequent
interpretations, the motion to dismiss would be properly interposed
in any one of the following five situations:
1. Whenever the petition has been filed more than five years from
the date of conviction.8 4 Although the statute provides an exemption
for those delays which were not due to the petitioner's culpable negligence,35 this issue would be conveniently determinable by the court
on argument on the motion to dismiss. The vagueness of the terms
"culpable negligence," incorporated from the provision on appeal in
80 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,

S101.27

(1959), and ILL. Rv.

STAT.

ch. 37,

S163

F2 (1959),

relate rather to furnishing a free transcript of the trial on demand of the judge or State's
Attorney at the post-conviction hearing or to granting a free transcript of the post-conviction hearing on filing a writ of error than to the right to a free transcript of the trial
to be attached initially to the petition. And ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, S 101.65-1 (1959),
appears limited to situations of direct review from the conviction.
31 ILL. REV. STAT.

ch. 38,

§

769.1 (1959).

32 Seidensticker, The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act: A Survey, 1 DE PAyL
LAw REv. 243, 248 (1952).

83 People v. Jennings, 411 Ill. 21,102 N.E.2d 824 (1952).
34 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, S826 (1959), reads: "No proceeding under this Act shall be
commenced more than five years after rendition of final judgment . . . unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his culpable negligence."
There is no provision for a period of limitations under either the UNIFORM POST-CONVICTION PROCEDURE Acr or 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (1948) (motion to vacate sentence). The
strong but moot inference is that claims pressed beyond the five-year period are not
meritorious.
85 A more formidable proviso is found in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-217 (1943) ("laches
or negligence").
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section 76 of the Civil Practice Act,8 6 invites judicial delineation, but
no reported 37 decisions have yet demarked their limits. However, it
seems highly probable that the construction of the same language as
employed in statutory coram nobis38 could be utilized to give content
to those words here, particularly since these remedies are in pari materia.
2. WVhenever the factual allegations of the petition, assumed to be
true, do not reveal the violation of a federal or state constitutional
right. Of those contentions which do not evidence constitutional deprivations, the following are representative.
a. Ordinary matters of procedure, 9 such as the insufficiency of the
indictment,4 ° the granting of a continuance, 41 and rulings on evidence, 42 are not constitutional questions.
b. The right to a speedy trial is not denied by a violation of the
"four term act ' 43 unless the delay is arbitrary and oppressive; 44 nor is
it violated by an arraignment six months after an arrest when the delay was occasioned by the conviction and four month imprisonment
of the petitioner for a crime committed while in jail.45
c. The right to due process of law is not infringed by the incompetency of counsel of one's own choosing except when it reduces the
trial to a farce or sham.4" So, too, no infraction of due process is involved in the mere failure to advise an eighteen-year old in a noncapital case of his right to counsel unless the petitioner indicates "that
he did not know of his right to counsel, that he did not fully under36 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 76 (1959).
37 The decisions in two federal habeas corpus actions, i.e., United States ex rel. Dopkowski v. Randolph, 262 F.2d. 10 (7th Cir. 1958), and United States ex rel. Lilyroth
v. Ragen, 222 F.2d. 654 (7th Cir. 1955), refer to earlier unreported state denials of postconviction petitions by those relators in which the Illinois Supreme Court refused to
apply the concept of a tolling of the five-year period during the petitioners' confinement in Washington and Indiana, respectively.
38 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 72 (1959).

People v. Hartman, 408 Ill. 133, 96 N.E.2d 449 (1951).
People v. Adams, 4 11.2d 453, 123 N.E.2d 327 (1954).
41 People v. Farley, 408 Ill. 288, 96 N.E.2d 453 (1951).
42 People v. Kirkwood, 17 Ill.2d 23, 160 N.E.2d 766 (1959).

39

40

ch. 38, § 748 (1959).
44 People v. Hartman, 408 Ill. 133, 96 N.E.2d 449 (1951); People v. Morris, 3 Ill.2d

43 ILL. REv. STAT.

437, 121 N.E.2d 810 (1954).
45 People v. Allen, 15 Ill.2d 455, 155 N.E.2d 561 (1959).
46 People v. Mitchell, 411 11. 407, 104 N.E.2d 285 (1952); People v. Heirens, 4 IIl.2d
131, 122 N.E.2d 231 (1954).
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stand the proceedings, that he was ignorant, illiterate or incompetent; ' 47 nor is it a federal constitutional deprivation to fail to assign
counsel at the arraignment; 48 nor is it the denial of a state constitutional right not to appoint counsel at such time, unless the petitioner
certifies his inability to procure counsel.49 Further, the stipulation by
an assistant public defender of the petitioner's sanity and a directed
verdict of sanity entered on such stipulation at a pre-trial restoration
proceeding are not violative of due process.5 0 A confession induced by
even a concededly unconstitutional conviction in an earlier trial does
not present a constitutional issue.5 '
d. The right to trial by jury is not eroded by an instruction that
the jurors are the triers of fact and law, since the instruction as a whole
renders this particular segment innocuous and since, as so limited, it
would not constitute reversible error on direct review.52
Contrariwise, the following instances have been held to constitute
denials of constitutional rights.
a. The right to an impartial jury is violated by necessarily and incurably inflammatory newspaper reports of a trial which are read by
all the jurors, even though on questioning by the trial judge the jury
deny the prejudicial effect of the reports, and despite a cautionary admonition to them from the judge.538 Moreover, there is no impartial
jury when the members of a jury either have served on a jury which
has just acquitted the defendant of a similar, though separate, charge
or has heard the evidence at the previous trial.5 4
b. It is a denial of equal protection of the laws to refuse a free transcript of the trial record to an indigent defendant who seeks direct review by writ of error where review is a matter of right to all who
apply. 5
c. A court without jurisdiction of the person or subject matter
cannot constitutionally try an accused. 0
People v. Pring, 414 I1. 63, 69, 110 N.E.2d 214, 217 (1953).
People v. Clark, 405 111.483,91 N.E.2d 410 (1950).
49 Ibid.
50 People v. Reeves, 412 Ill. 555, 107 N.E.2d 861 (1952).
47
48

51 People v. LaFrana, 4 1ll.2d 261, 122 N.E.2d 583 (1954).
52 People v. Joyce, I Ill.2d 225, 115 N.E.2d 262 (1953).
53
54

People v. Hryciuk, 5 Ill.2d 176, 125 N.E.2d 61 (1955).
People v. Adams, 4 Ill.2d 453, 123 N.E.2d 327 (1954) (dictum).

55 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).

56 People v. Manning, 412 Il. 519, 107 N.E.2d 856 (1952); People v. Jennings, 11 Ill.2d
610, 144 N.E.2d 612 (1957).
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d. The right to counsel is denied when the attorney of one's own
choice 57 or appointed counsel 8 is so incompetent that the proceedings
are reduced to a farce or sham and become, in effect, a travesty on
justice.
e. The requirements of due process are not met by the use of
knowingly perjured testimony, except where the jury is apprized that
the witness who perjures himself has a motive to do so." Of course,
due process will not permit the coercion of a confession,60 nor the inducement of a guilty plea by a promise to recommend leniency, when
thereafter the prosecutor reneges, even though the recommendation,
if it had been made, would not have been binding on the court.,'
3. When no affidavits accompany the petition and their absence is
not properly explained. If from the face of the record and the verified
statements of the petition the violation of a constitutional right is fairly
62
inferable, then the failure to attach affidavits will be excused.
4. When the petition reveals that a prior original or amended petition had been filed under the act. This generalization results directly
from the terms of section 828 of the act, which, although it speaks in
the language of waiver, was designed to prohibit, in all cases, more
than one original, amended, or supplemental post-conviction petition. 3 The reported decisions, however, have not touched upon this
issue, nor do they indicate whether the section applies equally to prevent new post-conviction petitions when a prior petition was dismissed on motion. One prosecuting officer,6 4 however, frankly concedes that a new petition will not be precluded by a previous dismissal
on motion, at least where the dismissal is grounded in a lack of affidavits or a failure to state a constitutional issue. It is dubious, too,
57 People v. Cox, 12 I1l.2d 265, 146 N.E.2d 19 (1957).
58 People v. Reeves, 412 I1. 555, 107 N.E.2d 861 (1952); People v. Morris, 3 Ill.2d
437, 121 N.E.2d 810 (1954); People v. Thomas, 18 Ill.2d 439, 170 N.E.2d 543 (1960).
59 Napue v. People, 13 Ill.2d 566, 150 N.E.2d 613 (1958).
60 People v. Evans, 4 I1.2d 211, 122 N.E.2d 730 (1954).
61 McKeag v. People, 7 I1.2d 586, 131 N.E.2d 517 (1956).
62 People v. Reeves, 412 Ill. 555, 107 N.E.2d 861 (1952).
63 This interpretation of the legislative intent in that of Albert E. Jenner, Jr., in his
exordium to the act. ILL. R~v. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, S826 (Supp. 1959). Observe also that,
by dint of S828, direct review by writ of error of constitutional issues which were or
could have been concluded on a prior post-conviction petition, even though appeal
therefrom is denied by a memorandum order, is precluded. People v. Lewis, 2 Ill.2d
323, 118 N.E.2d 11 (1954); People v. Byrd, 171 N.E.2d 782 (111. 1961).
64 Gaines, The Post Conviction Hearing Act, 39 Cm. B. REc. 418 (1957-1958).
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whether a failure to seek review by writ of error from either the denial after a hearing or the dismissal on motion will foreclose any future
petition.65 But it would seem that, apart from the legislative purpose
in enacting section 828, a failure to apply for writ of error, especially
after a hearing, would manifest an infirmity of resolution approaching
a waiver, if indeed it be not that, particularly since free transcripts on
appeal are mandated by statute.60
5. Whenever the petition or record indicates that a writ of error,
accompanied by bill of exceptions, had been brought to the Illinois
Supreme Court and that the conviction had been affirmed. A motion
to dismiss for this reason is predicated basically on the concept of res
judicata, which prevents the relitigation of constitutional issues once
finally determined by the Illinois Supreme Court.67 This doctrine has
been interpreted at times0 8 to include not only those issues which were
adjudicated but also those which might have been. On other occasions,
claims which could have been asserted before the court, if not raised,
have been deemed to be waived. 69 Whether we speak of those claims
which might have been addressed to the court on the prior review by
writ of error as now waived or res judicata, a motion to dismiss will
not properly be granted except in those cases where the identical allegations of constitutional defects now asserted had received a full and
final hearing in the Illinois Supreme Court. To do otherwise would be
to re-introduce the mechanical application of res judicata so roundly
condemned in the Jennings decision.7
If sufficient cause does not exist for a motion to dismiss, the State's
Attorney must respond to the petition in an answer, which may be unverified 71 but must be specific. Thereafter, a hearing should be held
65

A passing remark by Justice, now Chief Justice, Schaefer in People v. Allen, 15

1l.2d 455, 155 N.E.2d 561 (1959), makes it doubtful that a second petition would be

precluded by a prior unappealed denial. But compare the contrary view in two unreported opinions, i.e., People v. Canady, No. 1867 and People v. Brooks, No. 1795.
66 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, S 163 F2 (1959).
67 People v. Jennings, 411 Ill. 21, 102 N.E.2d 824 (1952). People v. Dale 406 111.238,
92 N.E.2d 761 (1950); People v. Dolgin, 6 Ill.2d 109, 126 N.E.2d 681 (1955); Davies v.
People, 10 Ill.2d 11, 139 N.E.2d 216 (1956).
68 People v. Thompson, 392 Ill. 589, 65 N.E.2d 362 (1946).

69 People v. Johnson, 15 Ill.2d 244, 154 N.E.2d 274 (1958); People v. Kirkrand, 14
Ill.2d 86, 150 N.E.2d 788 (1958).
70 People v. Jennings, 411 Ill. 21, 102 N.E.2d 824 (1952).
71 The answer, to be received as evidence, should be verified. Crowley, Judgment,
Sentence and Review, 1953 U. ILL. L. F. 383, 401.
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at which two general matters must be resolved. 72 Initially, the court
must determine whether the claims now made were or could have
been litigated in any previous proceeding. If the court concludes that
the petitioner has had prior adequate opportunity to present these allegations, the petition should be dismissed without proceeding further. If, however, the issues are neither res judicata nor waived, then
the court should decide whether by a fair preponderance of the evidence introduced at the hearing the petitioner has sustained his burden
of proving substantial denials of constitutional rights.
Waiver, of course, consists only in the intentional relinquishment
of known constitutional rights. Naturally, there can be no waiver
where an accused is prevented either by inculpable ignorance or other
extrinsic factors from raising constitutional objections. Therefore, the
decisions indicate at least two recurrent circumstances of waiver:
1. When direct review by writ of error with a bill of exceptions
had been prosecuted from a judgment of conviction but the constitutional claims now enunciated were not then raised.73
2. When the constitutional denials were not urged at the original
trial by petitioner, who was then represented by counsel of his own
choice or by competent appointed counsel and either failed to seek
direct review by writ of error or to obtain a bill of exceptions, in cases
of review by writ of error on the mandatory record.74 At the time the
Jennings decision elucidated the act's proper procedural course, defendants who failed to seek direct review could assert their indigence
to rebut the doctrine of waiver, but with Griffin v. Illinois75 and its
statutory aftermath, 6 that defense no longer obtains.
Several factual contexts may provoke problems of the pertinence of
the doctrine of res judicata. It may be that like constitutional matters
7

2

This format derives from People v. Jennings, 411 111. 21, 102 N.E.2d 824 (1952).

People v. Dolgin, 6 Il1.2d 109, 126 N.E.2d 681 (1955); Ciucci v. People, 21 I1.2d 81,
171 N.E.2d 34 (1960).
74 People v. Adams, 4 Ill.2d 453, 123 N.E.2d 327 (1954) (dictum); Ciucci v. People,
supra note 73. A waiver of ILL. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 38, S 736a (1959), obtains when an uncounseled accused fails to interpose timely objection at the arraignment. People v.
Clark, 405 I1. 483, 91 N.E.2d 409 (1950). Other hypothetical situations of waiver, i.e.,
neglect to assert constitutional objections on a prior petition for habeas corpus or
coram nobis proceeding, have not yet drawn the attention of the Illinois Supreme
Court, as revealed by the reported decisions. Also, under section 828 of the act, all
constitutional claims "not raised on the original or an amended petition" are waived.
75 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
76 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, S 101.65-1 (1959).
73
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were raised on a prior petition for a writ of habeas corpus, or for statutory coram nobis, or at the original trial itself. The decisions certify
that a previous habeas corpus petition, heard either originally in the
Supreme Court of Illinois"; or before an "inferior" court, 7 will be res
judicata on a post-conviction petition filed thereafter, unless new and
significant evidence is now adduced on those matters previously litigated.7" With respect to a previous denial of relief sought by way of
writ of error coram nobis, it would appear, although not definitively
established, that the doctrine of res judicata would preclude the relitigation of the same issues on a later post-conviction petition.80
In one sphere, however, the reported decisions have, to a greater
degree, carved out an area of certainty. The determination on constitutional issues at the original trial will not be res judicata in a postconviction hearing when either no direct review by writ of error or
when direct review by writ of error on the mandatory record alone
was taken from the conviction.8 ' Then, if not conclusive, should any
weight at all be accorded to the holding of the trial court on these
matters? According to the decision in People v. Jennings,82 "due
weight should be accorded that determination" but only where the
"claims were fairly asserted and litigated ....83 On another occasion,
the court viewed the trial court's determination as deserving of "some
significance.1 84 In still another case, the court observed that when both

at the original trial and at the hearing on the post-conviction petition
a confession was held to be voluntary, then to reverse those findings,
a showing that they were "manifestly against the weight of the evi' must be made. With obvious vacuity, it can be asserted that
dence"85
People v. Pring, 414 Ill.
63, 110 N.E.2d 214 (1953).
78 People v. Evans, 4 Il1.2d 211, 122 N.E.2d 730 (1954) (dictum).
79 Ibid.
77

80 People v. Manning, 412

.519, 107 N.E.2d 856 (1952).
S 101.65-1 (1959) (free transcripts for

81 Yet, a recent statute, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110,

indigent persons on appeal), might warrant a finding of waiver where one fails, through
subjective causes, to press his claims of constitutional denials on appeal.
82 411111. 21, 25,102 N.E.2d 824, 826 (1952).

83 Thsproviso has proved to be of some singular significance. See People v. Wakat,
415 III. 610, 114 N.E.2d 706 (1953), where the issue of the voluntary character of a confession was held not to be "fairly asserted" when on the inquiry at the trial into the
circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession a prosecuting official perjured
himself.
84 Davies v. People, 10 Il1.2d 11, 139 N.E.2d 216 (1956).

85 Reck v. People, 7 111.2d 261, 130 N.E.2d 200 (1955).
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there is an indefinable lacuna between no weight and conclusive
weight to which the courts will assign prior trial court adjudications
on constitutional claims.
In general, the procedure at the post conviction hearing will accord
with that which, in the judge's discretion, is most suitable.8 6 Therefore, the petitioner cannot assert an absolute right to be personally
present"7 but representation by counsel, at least for indigent petitioners, would appear to be essential, 8 since the burden of proof is upon
the petitioner at the hearing.89 The introduction of evidence is also to
be governed by the discretion of the hearing judge. Consequently, he
need not hear oral testimony, 90 nor need he read the transcript of the
trial,9 ' but in reconsidering issues once litigated at the original trial the
court may not limit its investigation to matters presented at the original trial.92 If the court determines that there has been a substantial denial of constitutional rights, the usual disposition will be to set aside
the conviction and order a new trial,93 but the court, in some instances,
is empowered to make appropriate orders without disturbing the conviction.94
Appeal by either petitioner or State's Attorney9" from a denial of
8

6 People v. Wakat, 415 Ill. 610, 114 N.E.2d 706 (1953). Under these terms, it may
be that the court could convene a jury to hear the cause. In North Carolina, the PostConviction Hearing Act expressly excludes a jury. N.C. GEN. STAT., S 15-221 (1943).
87 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, S 831 (1959); People v. Adams, 4 IH.2d 453, 123 N.E.2d 327
(1954) (dictum); People v. Jennings, 411 Ill. 21, 102 N.E.2d 824 (1952). The Oregon
statute, i.e., ORE. REv. STAT. ch. 636, § 12 (1959), requires the presence of the prisoner
unless the sole issue is one of law.
88 People v. Mitchell, 411 Ill. 407, 104 N.E.2d 285 (1952); People v. Cummins, 414 Ill.
308, Ill N.E.2d 307 (1953).
89
People v. Alden, 15 Ill.2d 498, 155 N.E.2d 617 (1959); People v. Thomas, 18
1ll.2d 439, 170 N.E.2d 543 (1960).
90 People v. Mitchell, 411 Ill. 407, 104 N.E.2d 285 (1952).
91 People v. Thomas, 18 1L.2d 439, 170 N.E.2d 543 (1960). Under ILL. REv. STAT. ch.
37, § 163 F2 (1959), a free transcript of the trial court record, in whole or in part,
will be granted to the petitioner whenever the court or state's attorney so directs.
The concluding clause, of course, seriously narrows the usefulness of this provision
and may therefore contravene the mandate of Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
92 People v. Wakat, 415 111. 610, 114 N.E.2d 706 (1953).
93 ILL. R.V. STAT. ch. 38 § 831 (1959). People v. Wakat, supra note 92. People v.
Jennings, 411 I1. 21, 102 N.E.2d 824 (1952).
94 People v. Dolgin, 6 Ill.2d 109, 126 NE..2d 681 (1955) (sentence reduced from two
to ten years to one to five years, but decision reversed on other grounds); People v.
Griffin, 9 Il.2d 164, 137 N.E.2d 485 (1956) (free transcript of trial record).
9
5 People v. Wakat, 415 111. 610, 114 N.E.2d 706 (1953); People v. Joyce, I Il.2d 225,
115 N.E.2d 262 (1953).

DE PAUL LAW REVIEW

post-conviction relief is by petition for writ of error to the Illinois Supreme Court which, in the majority of cases,90 has been refused by the
court, usually in the terms of unpublished memoranda orders. 7 To
perfect such review, it is requisite to file the petition within six
months98 of the entry of the judgment at the post-conviction hearing,
but a failure to do so is not a bar to review unless the statute of limitations is timely raised by motion.9 9 Furthermore, on application for
review the clerk of the trial court must submit, within thirty days,
"all records, pleadings, exhibits and evidence presented to the trial
court."'100 In reviewing-once the application is allowed-the trial
court's decision, the court has declared that only "manifestly erroneous"''1 1 holdings will be reversed. Re-examination and reassessment of
the evidence presented to the trial court is the method by which that
issue will be determined.
Even the casual observer must have gleaned from this discussion that
the Post-Conviction Hearing Act has not achieved administrative perfection. Nowhere else is the disclosure of the functional defect in failing to coordinate the remedies of coram nobis and habeas corpus into
one comprehensive procedure more telling than in the decisions of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in cases where
Illinois state prisoners had petitioned for release by way of federal
habeas corpus. By statutory mandate,0 2 federal courts cannot exercise
jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus by state prisoners until
there has been an exhaustion of remedies available in the state courts
as to the exact question which is now urged. In applying this rule, a
recent case103 held that a state court prisoner who had fully utilized
the Post-Conviction Hearing Act could not apply to the federal courts
O Leighton, Post-TrialProcedure,47 ILL. B. J. 261 (1958).
97 Gaines, supra note 64.
98 N.C. GEN. STAT., § 15-222 (1943) (60 days); MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, S645-1 (1957)
(30 days).
99 People v. Bernatowicz, 413 Ill. 181, 108 N.E.2d 479 (1952). An earlier unpublished
opinion considered the defect to be jurisdictional. People v. Washington, No. 1265,
Sup. Ct. Ill.
100 IL.L. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 5 101.27 (1959); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, S 163 F2 (1959).
Accord, MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, 5 645-E (1957), but only as to indigent appellants.
101 People v. Alden, 15 Ill.2d 498, 155 N.E.2d 617 (1959); Davies v.People, 10 ll.2d
11, 139 N.E.2d 216 (1956); Reck v. People, 7 Ill.2d 261, 130 N.E.2d 200 (1955).
102 28 U.S.C.A. S 2254 (1948).
103 United States ex rel. Sproch v. Ragen, 246 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1957).
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for release until he had petitioned for certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court from denial of a later petition in the state court for
habeas corpus.104 On principle, of course, the decision is not reconcilable with the doctrines of res judicata and waiver or the Post-Conviction Hearing Act itself, 10 5 but apart from that, this unfortunate result might have been avoided if there were in Illinois only one postconviction procedure of a collateral nature.
From the juridical vantage point, then, the proliferation of postconviction remedies, although well-intentioned, is inherently unsound.
Psychological considerations compel the same evaluation. It should be
a matter of common knowledge that before the reformative process
may begin the transformation of the prisoner back to proper social
behavior, he must acquiesce in it. Yet, what incentive is there for one
imprisoned in the penitentiary to do so when we offer him the tantalizing bait of numerous, involved post-conviction remedies which
awake in him an endless succession of "one last hope" for release?
Under such circumstances, the truly guilty criminal, even though unjustly convicted, will never form that firm purpose of amendment
necessary to his proper readjustment and, indeed, each denial of the
long series of post-conviction procedures will, on the contrary, inculcate in him a fixed abomination for the law and, what he deems to be,
the administrative artificialities thwarting his release.
Apart from a consolidation of all post-conviction remedies of a collateral character into one direct and final format, the creation of a new
court, limited in jurisdiction to constitutional matters, might be sug104 The dilemma of petitioner is not lessened by this admonition since if a petition
now filed for certiorari is denied as untimely, this will itself constitute a failure to
exhaust state remedies. United States ex rel. Peckham v. Ragen, 241 F.2d 318 (7th Cir.
1957). So too, a denial of post-conviction relief for culpable failure to file within the
five-year period amounts to a neglect to exhaust your state remedies. United States
ex rel. Dopkowski v. Randolph, 262 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1958). There is also no fulfillment of the rule in the following cases: petition under Post-Conviction Hearing Act
pending before state court, United States ex rel. Hunter v. Bibb, 249 F.2d 839 (7th Cir.
1957); failure to petition under the act even though the five-year period has now expired, United States ex tel. Stevens v. Ragen, 244 F.2d 420 (7th Cir. 1957); neglect to
allege the issue now presented on the post-conviction petition even though a denial of
relief has now effected a waiver of that matter, United States ex tel. Langer v. Ragen,
237 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1956); no application for writ of error from dismissal of postconviction petition even though the six-month period has now expired, United States
ex rel. Stewart v. Ragen, 231 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1956); denial of a petition for postconviction relief which sought to excuse its untimely filing for reasons different from
those now asserted, United States ex tel. Lilyroth v. Ragen, 222 F.2d 654 (7th Cir.
1955).
105 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 828 (1959).
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gested in order not alone to alleviate these procedural and psychological disadvantages but more to stimulate and perpetuate a positive public concern for the mechanics of assuring their constitutional rights.
In other legal systems, °6 such a court presently functions to clarify
constitutional issues, usually when they arise in the course of the trial.
The business of this proposed court could extend beyond constitutional questions relevant to a post-conviction petition for relief to circumscribe the totality of constitutional issues, which could be presented to the court by direct petition or by certification from other
courts of original or appellate jurisdiction. Where its jurisdiction over
a post-conviction petition is invoked, the procedure in this court might
require a hearing in all but limited situations, where for jurisdictional
or other formal reasons a petition were to be preliminarily denied,
with, however, a right in all cases to reapply. In addition, the composition of the court might include three judges, drawn possibly from
the ranks of retired attorneys, judges, or even law professors, for
whom a seat on this court would be more honorary than compensatory. Decisions, in written and officially reported form in all cases, of
this constitutional court should not be appealable except by petition
for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. It should be evident even from this succinct outline that the design envisioned by this
court is that of simplicity, brevity, finality, and certainty where constitutional issues arise. The fear is not, it is well to add, that our vision
will no longer be toward the suTmum jus but that, despite this laudable goal, the summa injuria will ensue.
100 In West Germany the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericbt,
abbreviated BVG) of twenty-four judges possesses very extensive jurisdiction, including, since relevant to our inquiry, "complaints by private persons who assert that their
constitutional rights are violated by the public authority." Dietze, ConstitutionalCourts
in Europe,60 DIcK. L. REV. 313, 321 (1956). See also Rheinstein, The Approach to Germian Law, 34 IND. L. J. 546, 548 (1959). The Italian Constitution of 1947 created a Constitutional Court (Corte Costituzionale) which, because of the cumbersome process
designed to select its fifteen judges, did not become operative until 1956. Article 137
of the Italian Constitution expressly prohibits all appellate review of the decisions of
the court but, unfortunately, article 134 so limits the jurisdiction of the court that its
primary concern is with claimed unconstitutional legislation. Cassandro, The Constitutional Court of Italy, 8 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1959); Farrelly & Chan, Italy's Constitutional Court: Procedural Aspects, 6 AM. J. CoMp. L. 314 (1957); 2 PEASLEE, CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS 275-302 (1950). For Venezuela, see Nebreda-Urbaneja and Berg,
Introduction to the Venezuelan Legal System-A Typical Civil Law System of Latin
America, 10 DEPAUL L. R V.41, 45-46 (1960). And see, in general, KELSEN, GENERAL
THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 155 ff. (1945).

